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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order granting Jose Luis Villavicencio's 
Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 2005, the state charged Villavicencio with possession of methamphetamine 
and possession of paraphernalia in CR-2005-2654. (R., pp.25-26.) Villavicencio also 
had multiple charges pending against him in CR-2004-2777 and CR-2005-2259. (R., 
p.29.) To resolve these cases, Villavicencio entered into a global, binding Rule 11 plea 
agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the possession of methamphetamine 
charge in CR-2005-2654, and to both an additional possession charge and a no contact 
order violation in CR-2004-2777. (R., pp.44-45.) In exchange, the state would dismiss 
all remaining counts and CR-2005-2259 in its entirety. (Id.) The parties also agreed 
that the court would retain jurisdiction over Villavicencio with underlying consecutive 
sentences on the possession convictions of five years with one and a half years fixed, 
for a total sentence of ten years with three years fixed. (R., p.45.) After the period of 
retained jurisdiction, Villavicencio would be placed on probation for ten years. (Id.) 
The district court accepted the binding plea agreement. (R., p.48.) Pursuant to 
that agreement, the district court sentenced Villavicencio to two consecutive unified 
terms of five years with one and a half years fixed, for a total sentence of ten years with 
three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (R., pp.40-42.) Following the 
period of retained jurisdiction, consistent with the binding Rule 11 plea agreement, the 
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district court suspended the sentences and placed Villavicencio on probation for a 
period of ten years. (R., pp.97-103.) 
In 2013, the state filed a motion for a probation violation against Villavicencio. 
(R., pp.131-34.) Villavicencio filed a Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal 
sentence, arguing that his probation of ten years was illegal because it was ordered 
concurrent instead of consecutive, and the maximum term for possession was seven 
years. (R., pp.208-10.) The state objected to the motion on the bases that a ten-year 
probation was the binding agreement of the parties, that if the agreement violated 
Villavicencio's constitutional rights those rights were waived, and that, if the district court 
erred by imposing a ten-year probation, that error was invited. (R., pp.213-19.) A new 
district judge held an evidentiary hearing (see 5/5/2014 Tr.), and ultimately granted 
Villavicencio's motion (R., pp.249-54). The district court then issued a corrected order 
granting probation, reducing the period to seven years. (R., pp.256-59.) 
The state filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.262-64.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it corrected Villavicencio's sentence in a way that 
vitiated the parties' binding Rule 11 plea agreement? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Correcting Villavicencio's Illegal Sentence In A Way That 
Vitiated The Parties' Binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement 
A. Introduction 
Following concurrent periods of retained jurisdiction, in 2006, the district court 
suspended Villavicencio's consecutive five-year sentences, for a total underlying 
sentence of ten years, and placed him on concurrent probations, each for a period of 
ten years. (R., pp.97-103.) When he violated those probations seven and a half years 
later, Villavicencio filed a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the 
district court lacked authority to place him on probation for a period of ten years. (R., 
pp.208-10.) Because the maximum sentence for Villavicencio's crimes of possession of 
methamphetamine was seven years, the state agrees that the maximum term of 
probation which the court could order on either felony count was only seven years. See 
I.C. §§ 19-2601(7), 20-222(1). The sentence, as constructed by the district court, was 
therefore illegal and needed to be corrected. 
But this sentence was arrived at through a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, 
which required that Villavicencio be placed on probation for a period of ten years. (R., 
pp.44-48.) The agreement did not specify that Villavicencio serve two concurrent terms 
of probation, only that he be placed on probation for ten years. (R., p.45.) That term of 
the plea agreement, which was arrived at through negotiation, is not in and of itself 
illegal and could have been accomplished legally by imposing two consecutive periods 
of probation totaling a period of ten years. See State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260, 266, 
141 P.3d 1129, 1135 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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The district court erred by vitiating the parties' binding plea agreement, reducing 
Villavicencio's term of probation to a period of seven years in direct contradiction of the 
unambiguous condition of the agreement that Villavicencio serve probation for a period 
of ten years. The district court's order should be vacated and this case remanded for 
resentencing consistent with the binding Rule 11 plea agreement. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be 
reviewed by the Court de novo, in accordance with contract law standards." State v. 
Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005) (citation omitted). 
C. Idaho Criminal Rule 11 Requires The Sentencing Court To Implement The Legal 
Provisions Of The Parties' Plea Agreement 
A plea agreement is contractual in nature and must be measured by contract law 
standards. State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 376, 233 P.3d 750, 759 (2010). In 
September 2005, Villavicencio entered into a binding Rule 11 plea agreement with 
prosecutors in which the parties agreed to the following: 
1. That the Defendant will plead guilty to Count I of the 
Information in Case No. CR-05-2654, charging Defendant with the felony 
offense of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUSBTANCE [sic], in 
violation of Idaho Code §37-2732 (c)(1). The State will dismiss Count II, 
Possession of Paraphernalia. 
2. That the Defendant will plead guilty to Count I of the 
Information in Case No. CR-04-2777, charging the Defendant with the 
felony offense of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, in 
violation of Idaho Code §37-2732(e)(1 ). Further, Defendant will plead 
guilty to the Count VI of the Information, charging VIOLATION OF A NO 
CONTACT ORDER, in violation of Idaho Code §18-920. The State will 
dismiss all other Counts in this case. 
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3. That the State will dismiss Case No. CR-05-2259 in its 
entirety. 
4. That upon Defendant's pleas of guilty, he be committed to 
the Idaho Department of Corrections [sic] for a period of one and a half (1 
½) years determinate followed by three and a half (3 ½) years 
indeterminate, PER FELONY COUNT, for a total sentence of ten (10) 
years, said sentence being suspended, with the Court retaining 
jurisdiction. Additionally, Defendant shall serve 180 days for the 
misdemeanor charge, said sentence to run concurrent with the retained 
jurisdiction. 
5. Upon successful completion of the retained jurisdiction, 
Defendant be placed upon supervised probation for a period of ten (10) 
years .... 
(R., pp.44-45.) The district court accepted the binding plea agreement. (R., p.48.) 
Under Rule 11, this bound the district court to "implement the disposition provided for in 
the plea agreement." I.C.R. 11 (f)(3). 
In 2006, the district court attempted to sentence Villavicencio to probation for a 
period of ten years consistent with the parties' agreement. But the district court had a 
concern. It explained to the parties: 
Counsel, one thing I want to make clear on the record for 
somebody who may be reviewing this in the future, that the parties agreed 
with regard to the sentencing in this matter, that the Court would impose a 
1 ½ year fixed and 3 ½ year indeterminate in these cases and that those 
sentences would be concurrent. That of course is a five year sentence. 
But the parties, in return for the Rider and the promise that the State 
would go along with probation if the defendant was successful on that 
Rider, agreed to a 10-year probation. Technically in the absence of that 
agreement, the Court would not have an ability to impose a 10-year 
probation because that would be considered a blended sentence of the 
putting together a concurrent and a consecutive term. But the Court 
believes, because this was done pursuant to a plea agreement, that it can 
impose a 10-year probation because of the fact that it could have at the 
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time of sentencing imposed a sentence of up to 1 0 years by making the 
sentences consecutive, and the parties granted the Court authority to do 
that. 
I will put that on the record so it is clear why the Court imposed a 
10-year probation on two concurrent five-year terms. 
(R., p.215; see also 3/6/2006 Tr., p.7, L.4 - p.8, L.3.) Thus, based on its belief that it 
had originally ordered Villavicencio's sentences to run concurrently with one another, 
and recognizing that the sentence would technically be illegal-even if the negotiated 
condition that Villavicencio serve probation for a period of ten years was not-the 
district court placed Villavicencio on concurrent probations for a period of ten years. 
(R., pp.99-104.) 
But the district court's underlying premise, that the original sentences were 
concurrent, was mistaken. In fact, the underlying sentences agreed to by the parties 
and imposed by the district court were consecutive sentences, totaling a period of ten 
years. (R., pp.42, 45.) The district court therefore could have correctly sentenced 
Villavicencio to consecutive probations which together totaled ten years, consistent with 
the parties' agreement. 
The district court's factual error in 2006 did not relieve it of its duty to "implement 
the disposition provided for in the plea agreement" when Villavicencio finally challenged 
his sentence in 2014. A defendant is not permitted to retain the benefits of a plea 
agreement while at the same time disclaiming aspects that benefit the state. State v. 
Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482,484, 943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). The state is entitled to 
receive the reciprocal benefit of its bargain, too. !si, And the district court, obligated by 
Rule 11 to ensure that each party receive the benefit of their plea bargain, had the 
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authority to correct the sentence's illegality in a way that "implement[ed] the disposition 
provided for in the plea agreement." Instead of vitiating the plea agreement to remove 
the illegality, the district court should have resentenced Villavicencio and corrected the 
illegality in a manner consistent with the agreement. 
But the district court was reluctant, opining that State v. Allen, 144 Idaho 875, 
172 P .3d 1150 (Ct. App. 2007), prohibited it from correcting the sentence in this case. 
(5/5/2014 Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.6.) In Allen, the Court of Appeals held that "[o]nce 
sentence has been pronounced without mention of prejudgment incarceration ... the 
court may ,not increase that sentence by issuing a subsequent judgment or amended 
judgment" under Idaho Criminal Rule 36 "that withholds credit mandated by I.C. § 18-
309." kl at 878, 172 P.3d at 1153. The Court's holding in Allen is inapplicable. First, 
credit for time served is not at issue. Second, unlike Allen, correcting Villavicencio's 
sentence so that it is both legal and consistent with the parties' negotiated agreement 
does not require that the court "increase [Villavicencio's] sentence by issuing a 
subsequent judgment or amended judgment." 
Allen does not prohibit the district court from correcting Villavicencio's illegally 
structured sentence, and doing so in a way that implements the terms of the parties' 
negotiated binding plea agreement. First, converting two concurrent probations, each 
for a period of ten years, to two consecutive probations totaling a single term of ten 
years does not "increase the sentence." But even if it did, the Court has recently 
explained that where additions to a sentence are mandatory and necessary to correct 
an illegal sentence, such alterations are within a court's authority under Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35(a). State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 582, 288 P.3d 132, 137 (Ct. App. 
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2012). Because upon accepting a negotiated plea agreement the district court is bound 
under Rule 11 to "implement the disposition provided for in the plea agreement," the 
condition that Villavicencio be placed on probation for a period of ten years is in fact 
mandatory, and the district court is authorized to correct the sentence in order to 
implement that provision under Rule 35. 
Even if the parties' agreed upon sentence of probation for a term of ten years 
were illegal, then the correct remedy still would not be to reduce Villavicencio's term of 
probation. If any term of the plea agreement is held illegal, then the plea agreement will 
be rendered inoperable. See Haessly v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463, 
465, 825 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1992) (citations omitted). Where a plea agreement is 
inoperable, the proper remedy is to rescind the agreement and return the parties to the 
status quo ante. See Bernard & Son, Inc. v. Akins, 109 Idaho 466, 470-71, 708 P.2d 
871, 87 5-76 ( 1985) (where contract has been rendered inoperable, rescission is the 
proper remedy). 
But the Court need not reach such a drastic remedy in this case. When a 
sentence is illegal, the remedy provided by Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is to correct the 
illegal sentence. I.C.R. 35(a). Under Idaho Criminal Rule 11, the district court is 
required to "implement the disposition provided for in the plea agreement." The district 
court can accomplish both in this case by resentencing Villavicencio to probation for a 
term of ten years, consistent with the plea agreement, through consecutive probations, 
consistent with Idaho law. See Horejs, 143 Idaho at 266, 141 P.3d at 1135. The district 
court's amended judgment should be vacated and this case remanded for the court to 
resentence Villavicencio consistent with the parties' binding Rule 11 plea agreement. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's amended 
judgment and remand this case for resentencing consistent with the parties' binding 
Rule 11 plea agreement. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2014. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of November, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SARA B. THOMAS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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